| Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) |
v.
and
Attorney General of Manitoba, Democracy
Watch and National
Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO), Environment
Voters, a division
of Animal Alliance of Canada, and John
Herbert Bryden
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ALBERTA
The respondent brought an action for a declaration that ss. 323(1) and (3), 350 to 360, and 362 of the Canada Elections Act were of no force or effect for infringing ss. 2(b), 2(d) and 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 350 limits third party election advertising expenses to $3000 in a given electoral district and $150,000 nationally; s. 351 prohibits individuals or groups from splitting or colluding for the purposes of circumventing these limits; ss. 352-357, 359-360 and 362 require a third party to identify itself in all of its election advertising, to appoint financial agents and auditors, and to register with the Chief Electoral Officer; and s. 323 provides for a third party advertising blackout on polling day. The trial judge concluded that ss. 350 and 351 were in prima facie violation of ss. 2(b) and 2(d) and that neither was justified under s. 1 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal upheld the unconstitutionality of ss. 350 and 351 and also struck down ss. 323, 352-357, 359-360 and 362 on the basis that the provisions "must all stand or fall together as part of the same design".
Held (McLachlin C.J. and Major and Binnie JJ. dissenting in part): The appeal should be allowed. The impugned provisions of the Canada Elections Act are constitutional.
Per Iacobucci, Bastarache, Arbour, LeBel, Deschamps and Fish JJ.: The current third party election advertising regime is Parliament's response to this Court's decision in Libman. In promoting the equal dissemination of points of view by limiting the election advertising of third parties who are influential participants in the electoral process, the overarching objective of the spending limits is electoral fairness. This egalitarian model of elections seeks to create a level playing field for those who wish to engage in the electoral discourse, enabling voters to be better informed. The Court of Appeal erred in considering the provisions on third party spending limits globally. While the regime is internally coherent, its constituent parts stand on their own and the constitutionality of ach set of provisions must be considered separately.
The limits on third party election advertising expenses set out in s. 350 infringe the right to freedom of political expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter but they do not infringe the right to vote protected by s. 3. The right to meaningful participation in s. 3 of the Charter cannot be equated with the exercise of freedom of expression. The two rights are distinct and must be reconciled. Under s. 3, the right of meaningful participation in the electoral process is not limited to the selection of elected representatives and includes a citizen's right to exercise his or her vote in an informed manner. In the absence of spending limits, it is possible for the affluent or a number of persons pooling their resources and acting in concert to dominate the political discourse, depriving their opponents of a reasonable opportunity to speak and be heard, and undermining the voter's ability to be adequately informed of all views. Equality in the political discourse is thus necessary for meaningful participation in the electoral process and ultimately enhances the right to vote. This right, therefore, does not guarantee unimpeded and unlimited electoral debate or expression. Spending limits, however, must be carefully tailored to ensure that candidates, political parties and third parties are able to convey their information to the voter; if overly restrictive, they may undermine the informational component of the right to vote. Here, s. 350 does not interfere with the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process.
The harm that Parliament seeks to address in this case is electoral unfairness. Given the difficulties in measuring this harm, at the stage of the justification analysis a reasoned apprehension that the absence of third party election advertising limits will lead to electoral unfairness is sufficient. Furthermore, on balance, the contextual factors favour a deferential approach to Parliament in determining whether such limits are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. While the right to political expression lies at the core of the guarantee of free expression and warrants a high degree of constitutional protection, there is nevertheless a danger that political advertising may manipulate or oppress the voter. Parliament had to balance the rights and privileges of all the participants in the electoral process. The difficulties of striking this balance are evident and, given the right of Parliament to choose Canada's electoral model and the nuances inherent in implementing this model, a court must approach the justification analysis with deference.
Section 350 is justified under s. 1 of the Charter. While the overarching objective of the third party advertising expense limits is electoral fairness, more narrowly characterized, the objectives of the scheme are threefold: (1) to promote equality in the political discourse; (2) to protect the integrity of the financing regime applicable to candidates and parties; and (3), to ensure that voters have confidence in the electoral process. In view of the findings of the Lortie Commission, the central piece of the evidential record in this case, these three objectives are pressing and substantial. Section 350 also meets the proportionality test. First, the third party advertising expense limits are rationally connected to the objectives. They prevent those who have access to significant financial resources, and are able to purchase unlimited amount of advertising, to dominate the electoral discourse to the detriment of others; they create a balance between the financial resources of each candidate or political party; and they advance the perception that the electoral process is substantively fair as it provides for a reasonable degree of equality between citizens who wish to participate in that process. Second, s. 350 minimally impairs the right to free expression. Third party advertising is unrestricted prior to the commencement of the election period, and third parties may freely spend money or advertise to make their views known or to persuade others. Further, the definition of "election advertising" in s. 319 only applies to advertising that is associated with a candidate or party. The limits set out in s. 350 allow third parties to inform the electorate of their message in a manner that will not overwhelm candidates, political parties or other third parties while precluding the voices of the wealthy from dominating the political discourse. Third, the s. 350's salutary effects of promoting fairness and accessibility in the electoral system and increasing Canadians' confidence in it outweigh the deleterious effect that the spending limits permit third parties to engage in informational but not necessarily persuasive campaigns.
Section 351 is ancillary to s. 350 and its primary purpose is to preserve the integrity of the advertising expense limits established under s. 350. It does not violate the freedom of expression, the right to vote or freedom of association. With respect to freedom of association, s. 351 does not prevent individuals from joining to form an association in the pursuit of a collective goal but rather precludes an individual or group from undertaking an activity, namely circumventing the third party election advertising limits set out in s. 350.
Section 323 infringes the right to free expression by prohibiting third parties from advertising on polling day. While it also engages the informational component of the right to vote, s. 323 does not infringe s. 3 as it does not have an adverse impact on the information available to voters. The infringement of s. 2(b) can be saved under s. 1. The objective of s. 323 -- to provide an opportunity to respond to any potentially misleading election advertising -- is pressing and substantial. The section is rationally connected to this objective and is minimally impairing. The blackout period is approximately 20 hours long and only applies to advertising. It has not been demonstrated to have any deleterious effects.
Because they restrict the political expression of those who do not comply with the scheme, ss. 352-357, 359-360 and 362 have the effect of limiting free expression. They do not infringe s. 3, however, as they enhance the right to vote. The infringement of s. 2(b) is justified under s. 1. These provisions advance the pressing and substantial objectives of proper implementation and enforcement of the third party election advertising limits and of provision to voters of relevant election information. They are rationally connected to the first objective and the disclosure provisions, by adding transparency to the electoral process, are also rationally connected to the second objective. Sections 352-357, 359-360 and 362 are minimally impairing. The disclosure and reporting requirements vary depending on the amount spent on election advertising and the personal information required of contributors is minimal. The salutary effects of the impugned measures outweigh the deleterious effects. By increasing the transparency and accountability of the electoral process, they discourage circumvention of the third party limits and enhance the confidence Canadians have in their electoral system. The deleterious effects, by contrast, are minimal.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Major and Binnie JJ. (dissenting in part): The third party advertising spending limits in s. 350 of the Canada Elections Act are inconsistent with the s. 2(b) Charter guarantees and, hence, invalid. The effect of third party limits for spending on advertising is to prevent citizens from effectively communicating their views on issues during an election campaign. The denial of effective communication to citizens violates free expression where it warrants the greatest protection -- the sphere of political discourse. Section 350 puts effective radio and television communication beyond the reach of "third party" citizens, preventing citizens from effectively communicating their views on election issues, and restricting them to minor local communication. Effective expression of ideas thus becomes the exclusive right of registered political parties and their candidates.
Because citizens cannot mount effective national television, radio and print campaigns, the only sustained messages voters see and hear during the course of an election campaign are from political parties. The right of a citizen to hold views not espoused by a registered party and to communicate those views is essential to the effective debate upon which our democracy rests, and lies at the core of the free expression guarantee. Any limits to this right must be justified under s. 1 of the Charter by a clear and convincing demonstration that they serve a valid objective, do not go too far, and enhance more than harm the democratic process. Promoting electoral fairness by ensuring the equality of each citizen in elections, preventing the voices of the wealthy from drowning out those of others, and preserving confidence in the electoral system, are pressing and substantial objectives in a liberal democracy.
However, the infringement of the right to free expression is not proportionate to these objectives. There is no evidence to support a connection between the limits on citizen spending and electoral fairness, and the legislation does not infringe the right to free expression in a way that is measured and carefully tailored to the goals sought to be achieved. The limits imposed on citizens amount to a virtual ban on their participation in political debate during the election period, except through political parties. As in Libman, the Attorney General has not demonstrated that limits this draconian are required to meet the perceived dangers.
Section 351 is invalid since it is keyed exclusively to the spending limits in s. 350. The polling day blackout in s. 323 infringes s. 2(b) of the Charter, but is justified as a reasonable measure in a free and democratic society under s. 1. The provisions in ss. 352-57, 359-60, 362 of the Act requiring citizens to register with the Chief Electoral Officer, self-identify on advertisements, and disclose their adherents and the nature of their expenditures serves the interests of transparency and an informed vote in the political process. Thus, the infringements to s. 2(b) are saved by s. 1.
Cases Cited
By Bastarache J.
Followed: Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877; Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158; Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995; Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, 2003 SCC 37; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; applied: R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; referred to: National Citizens' Coalition v. Attorney General of Canada (1984), 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 249; R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2; R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 06; Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, 2001 SCC 94; Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; overruled in part: Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General) (1996), 184 A.R. 241; Pacific Press v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2000] 5 W.W.R. 219, 2000 BCSC 248.
By McLachlin C.J. and Major J. (dissenting)
Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569; R. v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 2002 SCC 14; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877; Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, 2003 SCC 37; R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, 2002 SCC 8; U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083; Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (1972); Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General) (1996), 184 A.R. 241; Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876; R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154; McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229; R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, ss. 259.1(1) [ad. 1993, c. 19, s. 112], 259.2(2) [idem].
Canada Elections Act, S.C. 1974, c. 5.
Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 319, 323, Part 17, 349-362,
496, 500, 501.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1,
2(b), 2(d), 3.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47.
Referendum Act, R.S.Q. c. C-64.1.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
Authors Cited
Canada. Committee on Election Expenses. Report of the Committee on Election Expenses. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966.
Canada. Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report. Ottawa: The Commission, 1991.
Feasby, Colin. "Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the Administration of the Process of Democracy under the Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian Model" (1999), 44 McGill L.J. 5.
Fiss, Owen M. The Irony of Free Speech. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1996.
Johnston, Richard. "The Volume and Impact of
Third-Party Advertising in the 1988 Election", preliminary study (University of
British Columbia, December 1990).
Johnston, Richard, et al. Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal (2002), 14 Alta. L.R. (4th) 4, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 275, 320 A.R. 1, [2003] 8 W.W.R. 595, [2002] A.J. No. 1542 (QL), 2002 ABCA 301, affirming a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench (2001), 93 Alta. L.R. (3d) 281, 295 A.R. 1, 9 W.W.R. 650, [2001] A.J. No. 808 (QL), 2001 ABQB 558. Appeal allowed, McLachlin C.J. and Major and Binnie JJ. dissenting.
Graham R. Garton, Q.C., and Kirk Lambrecht, Q.C., for the appellant.
Alan D. Hunter, Q.C., Eric P. Groody and David H. de Vlieger, for the respondent.
Daniel Guttman and Michel Y. Hélie, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Jean-Yves Bernard and Jean-Vincent Lacroix, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Eugene B. Szach, for the intervener the Attorney General of Manitoba.
David Baker and Faisal Bhabha, for the interveners Democracy Watch and National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO).
Peter F.M. Jones, for the intervener Environment Voters, a division of Animal Alliance of Canada.
John Herbert Bryden, appearing on his own behalf.
The reasons of McLachlin C.J., Major and Binnie JJ. were delivered by
1THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND MAJOR J. (DISSENTING IN PART) -- This Court has repeatedly held that liberal democracy demands the free expression of political opinion, and affirmed that political speech lies at the core of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' guarantee of free expression. It has held that the freedom of expression includes the right to attempt to persuade through peaceful interchange. And it has observed that the electoral process is the primary means by which the average citizen participates in the public discourse that shapes our polity. The question now before us is whether these high aspirations are fulfilled by a law that effectively denies the right of an ordinary citizen to give meaningful and effective expression to her political views during a federal election campaign.
2 The law at issue sets advertising spending limits for citizens -- called third parties -- at such low levels that they cannot effectively communicate with their fellow citizens on election issues during an election campaign. The practical effect is that effective communication during the writ period is confined to registered political parties and their candidates. Both enjoy much higher spending limits. This denial of effective communication to citizens violates free expression where it warrants the greatest protection -- the sphere of political discourse. As in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, the incursion essentially denies effective free expression and far surpasses what is required to meet the perceived threat that citizen speech will drown out other political discourse. It follows that the law is inconsistent with the guarantees of the Charter and, hence, invalid.
I. Citizen Spending Limits
A. What the Law Does
350.(1) A third party shall not incur
election advertising expenses of a total amount of more than $150,000 during an
election period in relation to a general election.
(2) Not more than $3,000
of the total amount referred to in subsection (1) shall be incurred to promote
or oppose the election of one or more candidates in a given electoral district,
including by
(a) naming them;
(b) showing their
likenesses;
(c) identifying them by their respective political
affiliations; or
(d) taking a position on an issue with which they
are particularly associated.
Section 350(2)(d) is particularly restrictive. It prohibits individuals from spending more than the allowed amounts on any issue with which a candidate is "particularly associated". The candidates in an election are typically associated with a wide range of views on a wide range of issues. The evidence shows that the effect of the limits is to prevent citizens from effectively communicating their views on issues during an election campaign.
B. Is the Incursion on Free Speech Justified?
(1) The Significance of the Infringement
11 Political speech, the type of speech here at issue, is the single most important and protected type of expression. It lies at the core of the guarantee of free expression; see R. v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 2002 SCC 14, at para. 20; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 23; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, at para. 92; Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, at p. 175; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at p. 1336; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at p. 968.
12 The right of the people to discuss and debate ideas forms the very foundation of democracy; see Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100, at pp. 145-46. For this reason, the Supreme Court of Canada has assiduously protected the right of each citizen to participate in political debate. As Dickson C.J. stated in R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at p. 764, "[t]he state therefore cannot act to hinder or condemn a political view without to some extent harming the openness of Canadian democracy and its associated tenet of equality for all".
13 Section 2(b) of the Charter aims not just to guarantee a voice to registered political parties, but an equal voice to each citizen. The right of each citizen to participate in democratic discussion was embraced by Iacobucci J., who elaborated on the scope of s. 3 for the Court in Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, 2003 SCC 27, at para. 26:
Section 3 does not advert to the composition of Parliament subsequent to an election, but only to the right of each citizen to a certain level of participation in the electoral process. On its very face, then, the central focus of s. 3 is the right of each citizen to participate in the electoral process. This signifies that the right of each citizen to participate in the political life of the country is one that is of fundamental importance in a free and democratic society and suggests that s. 3 should be interpreted in a manner that ensures that this right of participation embraces a content commensurate with the importance of individual participation in the selection of elected representatives in a free and democratic state. Defining the purpose of s. 3 with reference to the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process, rather than the composition of Parliament subsequent to an election, better ensures that the right of participation that s. 3 explicitly protects is not construed too narrowly. [Emphasis added.]
Put simply, full political debate ensures that ours is an open society with the benefit of a broad range of ideas and opinions. This, in turn, ensures not only that policy makers are aware of a broad range of options, but also that the determination of social policy is sensitive to the needs and interests of a broad range of citizens.
Participation in political debate "is ... the primary means by which the average citizen participates in the open debate that animates the determination of social policy"; see Figueroa, supra, at para. 29.
16 The ability to engage in effective speech in the public square means nothing if it does not include the ability to attempt to persuade one's fellow citizens through debate and discussion. This is the kernel from which reasoned political discourse emerges. Freedom of expression must allow a citizen to give voice to her vision for her community and nation, to advocate change through the art of persuasion in the hope of improving her life and indeed the larger social, political and economic landscape; see R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, 2002 SCC 8, at para. 32; U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083, at para. 43.
17 Freedom of expression protects not only the individual who speaks the message, but also the recipient. Members of the public -- as viewers, listeners and readers -- have a right to information on public governance, absent which they cannot cast an informed vote; see Edmonton Journal, supra, at pp. 1339-40. Thus the Charter protects listeners as well as speakers; see Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at pp. 766-67.
[T]he right to speak and hear -- including the right to inform others and to be informed about public issues -- are inextricably part of [the First Amendment]. The freedom to speak and the freedom to hear are inseparable; they are two sides of the same coin. But the coin itself is the process of thought and discussion. The activity of speakers becoming listeners and listeners becoming speakers in the vital interchange of thought is the means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth. [Citations omitted.]
(2) The Law's Objective: Is it Pressing and Substantial?
Elections are fair and equitable only if all citizens are reasonably informed of all the possible choices and if parties and candidates are given a reasonable opportunity to present their positions so that election discourse is not dominated by those with access to greater financial resources.
26 Common sense dictates that promoting electoral fairness is a pressing and substantial objective in our liberal democracy, even in the absence of evidence that past elections have been unfair; see Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876, at para. 38. A theoretical objective asserted as pressing and substantial is sufficient for purposes of the s. 1 justification analysis; see Thomson Newspapers Co., supra, at para. 38; Harvey, supra, at para. 38; R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, at p. 191; McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at p. 281; Edmonton Journal, supra, at pp. 1343-45.
27 Thus we find that the Attorney General has asserted a pressing and substantial objective.
C. Proportionality
(1) Rational Connection
29 The Attorney General has offered no evidence to support a connection between the limits on citizen spending and electoral fairness. However, reason or logic may establish the requisite causal link; see Sharpe, supra, R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452. In Thomson Newspapers, supra, the Court accepted as reasonable the conclusion that polls exert significant influence on the electoral process and individual electoral choice. More to the point, in Libman, supra, the Court concluded that electoral spending limits are rationally connected to the objective of fair elections. While some of the evidence on which this conclusion was based has since been discredited, the conclusion that limits may in theory further electoral fairness is difficult to gainsay.
32 The question at this stage is whether the legislation infringes the right to free expression in a way that is measured and carefully tailored to the goals sought to be achieved. The "impairment of the right must be `minimal', that is, the law must be carefully tailored so that rights are impaired no more than necessary": RJR -- MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 160. The difficulty with the Attorney General's case lies in the disproportion between the gravity of the problem -- an apprehended possibility of harm -- and the severity of the infringement on the right of political expression.
(3) Proportionality
II. The Anti-Circumvention Provisions
351.A third party shall not circumvent, or attempt to circumvent, a limit set out in section 350 in any manner, including by splitting itself into two or more third parties for the purpose of circumventing the limit or acting in collusion with another third party so that their combined election advertising expenses exceed the limit.
46 This provision is too closely bound up with s. 350 to survive on its own. Under the doctrine of severance, "when only a part of a statute or provision violates the Constitution, it is common sense that only the offending portion should be declared to be of no force or effect, and the rest should be spared"; see Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at p. 696. Moreover, "[t]o refuse to sever the offending part, and therefore declare inoperative parts of a legislative enactment which do not themselves violate the Constitution, is surely the more difficult course to justify"; see Schachter, at p. 696. But, as Lamer C.J. has explained, at p. 697 (citing Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada, [1947] A.C. 503 (P.C.), at p. 518), the heart of the matter is
whether what remains is so inextricably bound up with the part declared invalid that what remains cannot independently survive or, as it has sometimes been put, whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that the legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires at all.
Parliament cannot be assumed to have enacted s. 351 independently of the citizen election spending limits in s. 350; see Schachter, supra, at p. 711. The section is keyed to the spending limits and has no other purpose. For this reason, s. 351 is invalid.
III. The Polling Day Blackout
IV. The Attribution, Disclosure and Registration Requirements
V. Conclusion
49 We would allow the appeal in part and answer the constitutional questions as follows:
1. Do ss. 323(1) and (3), 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360 and 362 of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, infringe s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
Yes with respect to ss. 323(1) and (3), 350, 352-357, 359, 360 and 362. It is not necessary to answer this question with respect to s. 351.
2. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
No with respect to s. 350. Yes with respect to ss. 323(1) and (3), 352-357, 359, 360 and 362. It is not necessary to answer this question with respect to s. 351.
3. Do ss. 323(1) and (3), 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360 and 362 of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, infringe s. 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
No.
4. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
It is not necessary to answer this question.
5. Do ss. 351, 356, 357(3), 359 and 362 of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, infringe s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
No with respect to ss. 356, 357(3), 359 and 362. It is not necessary to answer this question with respect to s. 351.
6. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
It is not necessary to answer this question.
The judgment of Iacobucci, Arbour, Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps et Fish JJ. was delivered by
BASTARACHE J. --
I. Introduction
50 At issue in this appeal is whether the third party spending provisions of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, violate ss. 2(b), 2(d) and 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. To resolve this issue, the Court must reconcile the right to meaningfully participate in elections under s. 3 with the right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b). This appeal also requires the Court to revisit the principles and guidelines set out in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, in the regulation of elections. Finally, this appeal calls for a consideration of the principles developed in Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, about the nature and sufficiency of evidence required when Parliament adopts a regulatory regime to govern the electoral process.
II. Judicial History
A. Alberta Court of Queen's Bench (2001), 93 Alta. L.R. (3d) 281
B. Alberta Court of Appeal (2002), 14 Alta. L.R. (4th) 4
III. Relevant Statutory Provisions
53Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9
323. (1) No person shall knowingly transmit election advertising to the public in an electoral district on polling day before the close of all of the polling stations in the electoral district.323. (1) Il est interdit à toute personne de sciemment diffuser de la publicité électorale dans une circonscription le jour du scrutin, avant la fermeture de tous les bureaux de scrutin de celle-ci.(2) The transmission to the public of a notice of an event that the leader of a registered party intends to attend or an invitation to meet or hear the leader of a registered party is not election advertising for the purpose of subsection (1).(2) Pour l'application du paragraphe (1), la diffusion d'un avis d'événement auquel le chef d'un parti enregistré a l'intention de participer ou une invitation à rencontrer ou à entendre le chef d'un parti enregistré ne constituent pas de la publicité électorale.(3) For the purpose of subsection (1), a person includes a registered party and a group within the meaning of Part 17.(3) Pour l'application du paragraphe (1), sont assimilés à des personnes les partis enregistrés et les groupes au sens de la partie 17.350. (1) A third party shall not incur election advertising expenses of a total amount of more than $150,000 during an election period in relation to a general election.350. (1) Il est interdit aux tiers, pendant la période électorale relative à une élection générale, de faire des dépenses de publicité électorale dépassant, au total, 150 000 $.(2) Not more than $3,000 of the total amount referred to in subsection (1) shall be incurred to promote or oppose the election of one or more candidates in a given electoral district, including by
(a) naming them;
(b) showing their likenesses;
(c) identifying them by their respective political affiliations; or
(d) taking a position on an issue with which they are particularly associated.(2) Du total visé au paragraphe (1), il est interdit aux tiers de dépenser, au total, plus de 3 000 $ pour favoriser l'élection d'un ou de plusieurs candidats ou s'opposer à l'élection d'un ou de plusieurs candidats, dans une circonscription donnée, notamment :
a) en les nommant;
b) en montrant leur photographie;
c) en les identifiant par la mention de leur appartenance politique;
d) en prenant une position sur une question à laquelle ils sont particulièrement associés.(3) The limit set out in subsection (2) only applies to an amount incurred with respect to a leader of a registered party or eligible party to the extent that it is incurred to promote or oppose his or her election in a given electoral district.(3) Le plafond prévu au paragraphe (2) ne s'applique aux dépenses engagées à l'égard du chef d'un parti enregistré ou d'un parti admissible que dans la mesure où elles servent à favoriser son élection dans une circonscription, ou à s'y opposer.(4) A third party shall not incur election advertising expenses of a total amount of more than $3,000 in a given electoral district during the election period of a by-election.(4) Il est interdit aux tiers, pendant la période électorale relative à une élection partielle, de faire des dépenses de publicité électorale dépassant 3 000 $, au total, dans une circonscription donnée.(5) The amounts referred to in subsections (1), (2) and (4) shall be multiplied by the inflation adjustment factor referred to in section 414 that is in effect on the issue of the writ or writs.(5) Les montants visés aux paragraphes (1), (2) et (4) sont multipliés à la date de délivrance du ou des brefs par le facteur d'ajustement à l'inflation visé à l'article 414.351. A third party shall not circumvent, or attempt to circumvent, a limit set out in section 350 in any manner, including by splitting itself into two or more third parties for the purpose of circumventing the limit or acting in collusion with another third party so that their combined election advertising expenses exceed the limit.351. Il est interdit à un tiers d'esquiver ou de tenter d'esquiver les plafonds prévus par l'article 350, notamment en se divisant en plusieurs tiers ou en agissant de concert avec un autre tiers de sorte que la valeur totale de leurs dépenses de publicité électorale dépasse les plafonds fixés à cet article.352. A third party shall identify itself in any election advertising placed by it and indicate that it has authorized the advertising.352. Les tiers doivent mentionner leur nom dans toute publicité électorale et signaler le fait que celle-ci a été autorisée par eux.353. (1) A third party shall register immediately after having incurred election advertising expenses of a total amount of $500 and may not register before the issue of the writ.353. (1) Le tiers doit s'enregistrer dès qu'il a engagé des dépenses de publicité électorale de 500 $ au total mais non avant la délivrance du bref.(2) An application for registration shall be sent to the Chief Electoral Officer in the prescribed form and shall include
(a) the name, address and telephone number of
(i) if the third party is an individual, the individual,
(ii) if the third party is a corporation, the
corporation and the officer who has signing authority for it, and
(iii) if
the third party is a group, the group and a person who is responsible for the
group;
(b) the signature of the individual, officer or person referred to in subparagraph (a)(I), (ii) or (iii), respectively, as the case may be;
(c) the address and telephone number of the office of the third party where its books and records are kept and of the office to which communications may be addressed; and
(d) the name, address and telephone number of the third party's financial agent.(2) La demande d'enregistrement est présentée au directeur général des élections selon le formulaire prescrit et comporte :
a) les nom, adresse et numéro de téléphone :
(i) si elle est présentée par un particulier, de celui-ci,
(ii) si elle est présentée par une personne morale, de celle-ci et d'un dirigeant autorisé à signer en son nom,
(iii) si elle est présentée par un groupe, de celui-ci et d'un responsable du groupe;
b) la signature du particulier, du dirigeant autorisé à signer au nom de la personne morale ou du responsable du groupe, selon le cas;
c) l'adresse et le numéro de téléphone du bureau du tiers où sont conservés ses livres et ses dossiers ainsi que ceux du bureau où les communications peuvent être transmises;
d) les nom, adresse et numéro de téléphone de l'agent financier du tiers.(3) An application under subsection (2) must be accompanied by a declaration signed by the financial agent accepting the appointment.(3) La demande doit être accompagnée d'une déclaration signée par l'agent financier pour accepter sa nomination.(4) If a third party's financial agent is replaced, it shall, without delay, provide the Chief Electoral Officer with the new financial agent's name, address and telephone number and a declaration signed by the new financial agent accepting the appointment.(4) En cas de remplacement de l'agent financier, le tiers doit en informer sans délai le directeur général des élections et lui fournir les nom, adresse et numéro de téléphone du nouvel agent financier et une déclaration signée par celui-ci pour accepter sa nomination.(5) If the third party is a trade union, corporation or other entity with a governing body, the application must include a copy of the resolution passed by its governing body authorizing it to incur election advertising expenses.(5) Les personnes morales, les syndicats ou autres entités ayant un organe de direction doivent en outre présenter avec leur demande une copie de la résolution adoptée par cet organe de direction pour autoriser l'engagement des dépenses de publicité électorale.(6) The Chief Electoral Officer shall, without delay after receiving an application, determine whether the requirements set out in subsections (1) to (3) and (5) are met and shall then notify the person who signed the application whether the third party is registered. In the case of a refusal to register, the Chief Electoral Officer shall give reasons for the refusal.(6) Dès réception de la demande, le directeur général des élections décide si celle-ci remplit les exigences prévues aux paragraphes (1) à (3) et (5) et informe le signataire du fait que le tiers est ou non enregistré. En cas de refus, il en donne les motifs.(7) A third party may not be registered under a name that, in the opinion of the Chief Electoral Officer, is likely to be confused with the name of a candidate, registered party, registered third party or eligible party.(7) Le tiers ne peut être enregistré sous un nom qui, de l'avis du directeur général des élections, est susceptible de créer de la confusion avec celui d'un parti enregistré, d'un parti admissible, d'un candidat ou d'un tiers enregistré.(8) The registration of a third party is valid only for the election period during which the application is made, but the third party continues to be subject to the requirement to file an election advertising report under subsection 359(1).(8) L'enregistrement du tiers n'est valide que pour l'élection en cours, mais le tiers reste assujetti à l'obligation de produire le rapport prévu au paragraphe 359(1).354. (1) A third party that is required to register under subsection 353(1) shall appoint a financial agent who may be a person who is authorized to sign an application for registration made under that subsection.354. (1) Le tiers tenu de s'enregistrer aux termes du paragraphe 353(1) doit nommer un agent financier; celui-ci peut être la personne autorisée à signer la demande d'enregistrement.(2) The following persons are not eligible to be a financial agent of a third party:
(a) a candidate or an official agent of a candidate;
(b) a person who is the chief agent, or a registered agent, of a registered party;
(c) an election officer or an employee of a returning officer; and
(d) a person who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act.(2) Ne sont pas admissibles à la charge d'agent financier d'un tiers :
a) le candidat ou l'agent officiel d'un candidat;
b) l'agent principal ou un agent enregistré d'un parti enregistré;
c) les fonctionnaires électoraux et le personnel du directeur du scrutin;
d) les personnes qui ne sont ni citoyens ni résidents permanents au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l'immigration355. (1) A third party that incurs election advertising expenses in an aggregate amount of $5,000 or more must appoint an auditor without delay.355. (1) Le tiers qui fait des dépenses de publicité électorale de 5 000 $ ou plus, au total, doit sans délai nommer un vérificateur.(2) The following are eligible to be an auditor for a third party:
(a) a person who is a member in good standing of a corporation, an association or an institute of professional accountants; or
(b) a partnership every partner of which is a member in good standing of a corporation, an association or an institute of professional accountants.(2) Seuls peuvent exercer la charge de vérificateur d'un tiers :
a) les membres en règle d'un ordre professionnel, d'une association ou d'un institut de comptables professionnels;
b) les sociétés formées de tels membres.(3) The following persons are not eligible to be an auditor for a third party:
(a) the third party's financial agent;
(b) a person who signed the application made under subsection 353(2);
(c) an election officer;
(d) a candidate;
(e) the official agent of a candidate;
(f) the chief agent of a registered party or an eligible party; and
(g) a registered agent of a registered
party.
(3) Ne sont pas admissibles à la charge de vérificateur d'un tiers
:
a) l'agent financier du tiers;
b) la personne qui a signé la demande d'enregistrement prévue au paragraphe 353(2);
c) les fonctionnaires électoraux;
d) les candidats;
e) l'agent officiel d'un candidat;
f) l'agent principal d'un parti enregistré ou d'un parti admissible;
g) un agent enregistré d'un parti
enregistré.(4) Every third party, without delay after an auditor is appointed,
must provide the Chief Electoral Officer with the auditor's name, address,
telephone number and occupation and a signed declaration accepting the
appointment.(4) Sans délai après la nomination, le tiers communique au directeur
général des élections les nom, adresse, numéro de téléphone et profession du
vérificateur, ainsi qu'une déclaration signée par celui-ci pour accepter sa
nomination.(5) If a third party's auditor is replaced, it must, without delay,
provide the Chief Electoral Officer with the new auditor's name, address,
telephone number and occupation and a signed declaration accepting the
appointment.
(5) En cas de remplacement du vérificateur, le tiers doit en
informer sans délai le directeur général des élections et lui communiquer les
nom, adresse, numéro de téléphone et profession du nouveau vérificateur, ainsi
qu'une déclaration signée par celui-ci pour accepter sa nomination.356.
The Chief Electoral Officer shall maintain, for the period that he or she
considers appropriate, a registry of third parties in which is recorded, in
relation to each third party, the information referred to in subsections 353(2)
and 355(4) and (5).356. Le directeur général des élections tient, pour la
période qu'il estime indiquée, un registre des tiers où sont consignés, pour
chaque tiers, les renseignements visés aux paragraphes 353(2) et 355(4) et
(5).357. (1) Every contribution made during an election period to a
registered third party for election advertising purposes must be accepted by,
and every election advertising expense incurred on behalf of a third party must
be authorized by, its financial agent.357. (1) Les contributions faites
au tiers enregistré à des fins de publicité électorale au cours de la période
électorale doivent être acceptées par son agent financier et les dépenses de
publicité électorale engagées pour son compte doivent être autorisées par
celui-ci.(2) A financial agent may authorize a person to accept contributions or
incur election advertising expenses, but that authorization does not limit the
responsibility of the financial agent.(2) L'agent financier peut déléguer
l'acceptation des contributions et l'autorisation des dépenses; la délégation
n'a toutefois pas pour effet de limiter sa responsabilité.(3) No third party
shall use a contribution for election advertising if the third party does not
know the name and address of the contributor or is otherwise unable to determine
within which class of contributor referred to in subsection 359(6) they fall.(3)
Il est interdit au tiers d'utiliser à des fins de publicité électorale des
contributions destinées à la publicité électorale provenant de donateurs dont il
ne connaît ni le nom ni l'adresse ou pour lesquels il ne peut déterminer la
catégorie dans le cadre du paragraphe 359(6).359. (1) Every third party
shall file an election advertising report in the prescribed form with the Chief
Electoral Officer within four months after polling day.359. (1) Le tiers
est tenu de présenter au directeur général des élections, selon le formulaire
prescrit, le rapport de ses dépenses de publicité électorale dans les quatre
mois qui suivent le jour du scrutin.(2) An election advertising report shall
contain
(a) in the case of a general election,
(i) a list of election advertising expenses referred to in subsection 350(2) and the time and place of the broadcast or publication of the advertisements to which the expenses relate, and
(ii) a list of all election advertising expenses other than those referred to in subparagraph (I) and the time and place of broadcast or publication of the advertisements to which the expenses relate; and
(b) in the case of a by-election, a list of election advertising expenses referred to in subsection 350(4) and the time and place of the broadcast or publication of the advertisements to which the expenses relate.(2) Le rapport doit donner :
a) dans le cas d'une élection générale :
(i) la liste des dépenses de publicité électorale visées au paragraphe 350(2), ainsi que les date et lieu de publication des annonces auxquelles elles se rapportent,
(ii) la liste des autres dépenses de publicité électorale, ainsi que les date et lieu de publication des annonces auxquelles elles se rapportent;
b) dans le cas d'une élection partielle, la liste des dépenses de publicité électorale visées au paragraphe 350(4), ainsi que les date et lieu de publication des annonces auxquelles elles se rapportent.(3) If a third party has not incurred expenses referred to in paragraph (2)(a) or (b), that fact shall be indicated in its election advertising report.(3) Dans les cas où aucune dépense de publicité électorale n'a été faite, le rapport doit signaler ce fait.(4) The election advertising report shall include
(a) the amount, by class of contributor, of contributions for election advertising purposes that were received in the period beginning six months before the issue of the writ and ending on polling day;
(b) for each contributor who made contributions of a total amount of more than $200 for election advertising purposes during the period referred to in paragraph (a), subject to paragraph (b.1), their name, address and class, and the amount and date of each contribution;
(b.1) in the case of a numbered company that is a contributor referred to in paragraph (b), the name of the chief executive officer or president of that company; and
(c) the amount, other than an amount of
a contribution referred to in paragraph (a), that was paid out of the
third party's own funds for election advertising expenses.
(4) Le rapport
doit aussi mentionner :
a) le montant, par catégorie de donateurs, des contributions destinées à la publicité électorale reçues dans les six mois précédant la délivrance du bref et pendant la période électorale;
b) pour les donateurs dont la contribution destinée à la publicité électorale au cours des six mois précédant la délivrance du bref et pendant la période électorale dépasse, au total, 200 $, sous réserve de l'alinéa b.1), leurs nom, adresse et catégorie ainsi que le montant de la contribution et la date à laquelle elle a été faite;
b.1) dans le cas où le donateur visé à l'alinéa b) est une société à dénomination numérique, le nom du premier dirigeant ou du président de la société;
c) le montant des dépenses de publicité
électorale que le tiers a faites sur ses propres fonds, compte non tenu des
contributions visées à l'alinéa a).
(5) For the purpose of subsection
(4), a contribution includes a loan.(5) Pour l'application du paragraphe (4), un
prêt est assimilé à une contribution.(6) For the purposes of paragraphs
(4)(a) and (b), the following are the classes of contributor:
(a) individuals;
(b) businesses;
(c) commercial organizations;
(d) governments;
(e) trade unions;
(f) corporations without share capital other than trade unions; and
(g) unincorporated organizations or associations other than trade unions.(6) Pour l'application des alinéas (4)a) et b), les catégories de donateurs sont les suivantes :
a) particuliers;
b) entreprises;
c) organisations commerciales;
d) gouvernements;
e) syndicats;
f) personnes morales n'ayant pas de capital-actions autres que les syndicats;
g) organismes ou associations non
constituées en personne morale.(7) If the third party is unable to identify
which contributions were received for election advertising purposes in the
period referred to in paragraph (4)(a), it must list, subject to
paragraph (4)(b.1), the names and addresses of every contributor who
donated a total of more than $200 to it during that period.(7) Si le tiers n'est
pas en mesure de déterminer si les contributions qu'il a reçues étaient
destinées à la publicité électorale, il doit donner les nom et adresse de tous
les donateurs, sous réserve de l'alinéa (4)b.1), ayant versé plus de 200
$ dans les six mois précédant la délivrance des brefs et pendant la période
électorale.(8) An election advertising report shall include the signed
declarations of the financial agent and, if different, of the person who signed
the application made under subsection 353(2) that the report is accurate.(8) Le
rapport doit contenir une attestation de son exactitude signée par l'agent
financier ainsi que, s'il ne s'agit pas de la même personne, par la personne qui
a signé la demande d'enregistrement.(9) A third party shall, at the request of
the Chief Electoral Officer, provide the original of any bill, voucher or
receipt in relation to an election advertising expense that is in an amount of
more than $50.(9) Sur demande du directeur général des élections, le tiers doit
produire les originaux des factures, reçus et justificatifs pour tout montant de
dépenses de publicité électorale supérieur à 50 $.360. (1) The election
advertising report of a third party that incurs $5,000 or more in election
advertising expenses must include a report made under subsection (2).360.
(1) Dans le cas où les dépenses de publicité électorale sont de 5 000 $ ou plus,
le rapport doit en outre être accompagné du rapport du vérificateur.
(2) The
third party's auditor shall report on the election advertising report and shall
make any examination that will enable the auditor to give an opinion in the
report as to whether the election advertising report presents fairly the
information contained in the accounting records on which it is based.(2) Le
vérificateur du tiers fait rapport de sa vérification du rapport sur les
dépenses de publicité électorale. Il fait les vérifications qui lui permettent
d'établir si, à son avis, ce rapport présente fidèlement les renseignements
contenus dans les écritures comptables sur lesquelles il est fondé. (3) An
auditor shall include in the report any statement that the auditor considers
necessary, when
(a) the election advertising report that is the subject of the auditor's report does not present fairly the information contained in the accounting records on which it is based;
(b) the auditor has not received from the third party all of the required information and explanation; or
(c) based on the auditor's examination,
it appears that proper accounting records have not been kept by the third party.
3) Il joint à son rapport les déclarations qu'il estime nécessaires lorsque,
selon le cas :
a) le rapport vérifié ne présente pas fidèlement les renseignements contenus dans les écritures comptables sur lesquelles il est fondé;
b) il n'a pas reçu du tiers tous les renseignements et explications qu'il a exigés;
c) sa vérification révèle que le tiers n'a pas tenu les écritures comptables appropriées.(4) The auditor shall have access at any reasonable time to all of the documents of the third party, and may require the third party to provide any information or explanation, that, in the auditor's opinion, is necessary to enable the auditor to prepare the report.(4) Il doit avoir accès, à tout moment convenable, aux documents du tiers qui, à son avis, peuvent être nécessaires pour l'établissement de son rapport et il a le droit d'exiger du tiers les renseignements et explications qui peuvent être nécessaires pour l'établissement de son rapport.362. The Chief Electoral Officer shall, in the manner he or she considers appropriate,
(a) publish the names and addresses of registered third parties, as they are registered; and
(b) publish, within one year after the issue of the writ, reports made under subsection 359(1).362. Le directeur général des élections publie, selon les modalités qu'il estime indiquées :
a) au fur et à mesure de leur
enregistrement, les nom et adresse des tiers enregistrés;
b) dans
l'année qui suit la délivrance des brefs, les rapports produits au titre du
paragraphe 359(1).
IV. Issues
54 The following constitutional questions were stated by the Chief Justice:
1. Do ss. 323(1) and (3), 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360 and 362 of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, infringe s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
2. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
3. Do ss. 323(1) and (3), 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360 and 362 of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, infringe s. 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
4. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
5. Do ss. 351, 356, 357(3), 359 and 362 of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, infringe s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
6. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
V. Analysis
A. Third Party Electoral Advertising Regime
"election advertising" means the transmission to the public by any means during an election period of an advertising message that promotes or opposes a registered party or the election of a candidate, including one that takes a position on an issue with which a registered party or candidate is associated. For greater certainty, it does not include
(a) the transmission to the public of an editorial, a debate, a speech, an interview, a column, a letter, a commentary or news;
(b) the distribution of a book, or the promotion of the sale of a book, for no less than its commercial value, if the book was planned to be made available to the public regardless of whether there was to be an election;
(c) the transmission of a document directly by a person or a group to their members, employees or shareholders, as the case may be; or
(d) the transmission by an individual, on a non-commercial basis on what is commonly known as the Internet, of his or her personal political views.
Thus, the limits do not apply to third party advertising prior to the election period or to advertising which promotes an issue that is not associated with a candidate or political party. The second part of the regime is closely related to s. 350 as it prohibits individuals or groups from splitting or colluding for the purposes of circumventing the election advertising limits. Third, the attribution, registration and disclosure provisions (ss. 352-357, 359-360 and 362) require a third party to identify itself in all of its election advertising and, under certain circumstances, to appoint financial agents and auditors who are required to record expenses, to register with, and to report to the Chief Electoral Officer who, in turn, makes this information available to the public. Finally, although s. 323 is not strictly part of the third party electoral advertising regime, third parties are also subject to the advertising blackout on polling day.
B. Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General)
[2] Spending limits are also necessary to guarantee the right of electors to be adequately informed of all the political positions advanced by the candidates and by the various political parties [free and informed vote]. ...
[3] For spending limits to be fully effective, they must apply to all possible election expenses, including those of independent individuals and groups [application to all-effectiveness of spending limits generally]. ...
[4] The actions of independent individuals and groups can [either] directly or indirectly support one of the parties or candidates, thereby resulting in an imbalance in the financial resources each candidate or political party is permitted. ... "At elections, the advocacy of issue positions inevitably has consequences for election discourse and thus has partisan implications, either direct or indirect: voters cast their ballots for candidates and not for issues" [issue advocacy vs. partisan advocacy]. ...
[5] It is also important to limit independent spending more strictly than spending by candidates or political parties. ... [O]wing to their numbers, the impact of such spending on one of the candidates or political parties to the detriment of the others could be disproportionate [application to all- effectiveness of spending limits generally]. [Emphasis added.]
C. Election Advertising Expense Limits
(1) Freedom of Expression
(2) The Right to Vote
68 The purpose of s. 3 was first considered in Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158. McLachlin J. (as she then was), in concluding that s. 3 does not require absolute equality of voting power, held that the purpose of s. 3 is effective representation. She explained, at p. 183:
It is my conclusion that the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in s. 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to "effective representation". Ours is a representative democracy. Each citizen is entitled to be represented in government. Representation comprehends the idea of having a voice in the deliberations of government as well as the idea of the right to bring one's grievances and concerns to the attention of one's government representative.
The Court has confirmed that effective representation is the purpose of s. 3 on several occasions; see Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995; Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876; Thomson Newspapers, supra; and Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, 2003 SCC 37.
It thus follows that participation in the electoral process has an intrinsic value independent of its impact upon the actual outcome of elections. To be certain, the electoral process is the means by which elected representatives are selected and governments formed, but it is also the primary means by which the average citizen participates in the open debate that animates the determination of social policy. The right to run for office provides each citizen with the opportunity to present certain ideas and opinions to the electorate as a viable policy option; the right to vote provides each citizen with the opportunity to express support for the ideas and opinions that a particular candidate endorses. In each instance, the democratic rights entrenched in s. 3 ensure that each citizen has an opportunity to express an opinion about the formation of social policy and the functioning of public institutions through participation in the electoral process. [Emphasis added.]
Greater participation in the political discourse leads to a wider expression of beliefs and opinions and results in an enriched political debate, thereby enhancing the quality of Canada's democracy.
(3) The s. 1 Justification Applicable to the Infringement of Freedom of Expression
(a) Contextual Factors
(i) The Nature of the Harm and the Inability to Measure It
78 This Court has, in the absence of determinative scientific evidence, relied on logic, reason and some social science evidence in the course of the justification analysis in several cases; see R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at p. 503; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at pp. 768 and 776; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 137; Thomson Newspapers, supra, at paras. 104-7; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2. In RJR-MacDonald,