“End the Seal Hunt” Strategy Framework
prepared for
the Directors of
Animal Alliance of Canada
& Environment Voters
Stephen Best
September 2003
Policy Change is a for-profit consulting company founded and owned by Environment Voters and Animal Alliance of Canada. Policy Change provides environmental and social justice organizations and socially responsible corporations with strategically relevant political, election campaign, government relations, industry relations, and communication services. In those cases where smaller groups or local municipal organizations are unable to raise the necessary funds to implement effective strategies, Policy Changes assists with fund raising and/or provides services on a pro bono basis.
Introduction
As an issue, the harp seal hunt in Canadian waters is not strategically complex. Indeed, few environmental or wildlife issues occur in such a simple and accessible strategic environment. A final, measurable objective is easily identified. All the relevant actors — and their interests in the issue, including their vulnerabilities — are apparent. Most of the activities and actors associated with Canadian sealing are in jurisdictions where all political, economic, and communication strategies and tactics are permitted, practical, and affordable. And, absolute control over the issue rests in one legal jurisdiction, which is highly vulnerable to multiple forms of political pressure. Fortunately for the advocates working to end the seal hunt — and for the seals — there are no significant strategic impediments to ending the Canadian seal hunt.
However, the Canadian harp seal populations are migratory; ending or reducing the Canadian hunt may not end the threat to the harp seal. Recognizing that fact, the Strategy Framework laid out below — because it relies on strategies that can be modified, scaled, and applied to other jurisdictions — will increase the pressure on other North Atlantic sealing countries to reconsider their seal hunt policies. For example, in the event that a reduction in Canadian sealing is offset by an increase in other seal hunts — West Ice (Greenland), White Sea (Russia) —to supply European markets, the principles that underpin the Strategy Framework below can be adapted and applied to the appropriate jurisdiction.
Most informed advocates concerned with ending the seal hunt agree that Canada’s seal hunt policy is based on, for the most part, serving the political ambitions of federal politicians. Even when the seal hunt has lacked economic importance, for example, it has been subsidized to meet political objectives. Therefore, it can be assumed for strategic planning purposes that the seal hunt will end — or be dramatically reduced — when two conditions are met in Canada:
1. the political cost of the seal hunt to federal politicians and political parties exceeds its political benefit, and
2. there is a plausibly justifiable reason for reducing the hunt, other than appearing to succumb to the pressures created by advocacy organizations.
The former can be achieved with electoral, political, and economic initiatives; the latter with well publicized scientific initiatives.
The Policy Change Strategy Framework that follows satisfies a broad range of short and long-term strategic and tactical objectives. The “End the Seal Hunt” Strategy Framework,
1. seizes the initiative, and places control of the seal hunt issue in the hands of the animal welfare and environmental protection community — it takes the fight to the enemy;
2. is proactive rather than reactive which allows for better planning, timing, targeting, and execution of the tactics required to implement the Strategy Framework;
3. eliminates and reverses most — and in some cases all — of the political and economic benefits enjoyed by the pro seal hunt community;
4. is based on the acquisition and application of negotiable power rather than on protest, which gives the animal welfare and environmental protection community the opportunity, for the first time, to negotiate Canada’s seal hunt policy from a position of political, economic, and scientific strength;
5. because it is based on power rather than protest, increases the overall political relevance and credibility of the animal welfare and environmental protection communities, and therefore their public policy negotiating power in other issues;
6. relies on strategic principles and tactics that are well understood by the pro seal hunt community, particularly politicians and industry representatives, and that are known to be effective;
7. would be highly resistant to any counter-strategies attempted by the pro seal hunt community;
8. employs redundant strategies that not only reinforce and augment each other, but also can, if necessary, operate independently of each other;
9. affects only important and strategically relevant seal hunt beneficiaries and supporters;
10. attacks and undermines the strategies that the pro seal hunt community relies upon to “sell” and maintain the seal hunt;
11. is transportable, modifiable, and scalable to other issues and jurisdictions;
12. is based on proven methods that have been applied successfully in the past to the seal hunt issue;
13. can use readily available “off the shelf” tactics, service providers, and products for implementation;
14. is controllable, affordable, can be accurately budgeted, can be cost controlled, and can be implemented on a pre determined schedule;
15. can be monitored to insure that it and the people who are implementing tactics are achieving the desired results on budget and on time, because the framework can employ measurable milestones and objectives;
16 can be expected to deliver its objective within two to five years (based on the current Canadian political environment and the expected federal election schedule — Spring 2004, 2008); and
17. is conducive to fund raising, membership acquisition, and increasing public support because it is a clear, easily understood strategy that most donors would agree would have a high probability of achieving the objective.
Defining the Objective
Strategies work best when a clear, achievable objective is stated at the outset. A clear goal helps in choosing the best tactics to implement the strategy. However, stating what “ending the seal hunt” actually means has challenged the animal welfare and environmental protection communities since the late 60s. Is it an end to the killing of “whitecoats?” Is it an end to the killing of the young of the year? An end to the killing of all seals in Canadian waters? Is it having independent observers accompanying every sealing group to insure a humane hunt? For the purposes of the Strategy Framework, “ending the seal hunt” is defined as …
… reducing the Canadian seal hunt to a Newfoundland and Labrador and Quebec industry that annually slaughters less than fifteen thousand harp seals and less than fifty hood seals — and has no exports, is not federally subsidized, and is economically declining.
This objective is recommended because it has already proved to be achievable, can be attained in a relatively short period of time (two to five years), protects the greatest number of seals practicable, is consistent with good marine mammal conservation science, and is affordable. Attaining more than this is theoretically possible, but would likely require resources that might be better spent on other issues to achieve a greater good for animals and the environment. It is also an objective that does not lay the seeds for the hunt’s resurrection, as other strategies have done. For example, in the early 70s the objective of the animal welfare and environmental groups was the end of the large ship-based hunt. The rationale was that if the large factory ships — which accounted for most of the slaughter of the “baby seals” and most of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) — were banned, the insignificant landsmen and small boat hunts could be tolerated because their takes were, in comparison, relatively small. Furthermore, it was assumed that with the end of large scale, commercial sealing, the local remnants of the industry would eventually disappear. The animal welfare movement, particularly the IFAW, was successful in having the large ships banned — a direct consequence of the European seal products import ban. However, the effect was to shift the TAC to the small boat and landsmen hunts — hunts that were always, and are to this day, essentially unregulated and far more cruel than the large ship hunt. Even more troubling, as thousands more Newfoundlanders and Quebecers took up sealing (the large ships employed about 200 people), the local political pressure and political advantages to enlarging and subsidizing the hunt increased. The strategy to ban the large ships, while it seemed a good approach at the time, greatly worsened the plight of the seals.
The Relevant Pro-sealing Groups
Thousands of people, hundreds of companies, and dozens of organizations — in Canada and internationally — have an interest in maintaining a robust Canadian sealing industry. They form a large community united for political, economic, and cultural reasons that continually pressures federal and provincial governments to protect, subsidize, and promote the sealing industry. However, only a few of these actors need to be given full consideration in a strategic framework to end the seal hunt. They are, in order of strategic importance:
1. Members of Parliament and federal political parties
2. Fishers, the fishing industry, and fishing organizations
3. Department of Fisheries and Oceans
4. Sealers, the sealing industry, and sealing organizations
The ranking
is based on the influence each group has on seal hunt policy. The federal
government — the Cabinet and MPs — have the sole
authority over the seal hunt. If they chose, they could end it with no
reference to the other three groups. Fishers and the fishing industry
are the most politically relevant group. If their support of the seal
hunt turned to opposition, the government would be more likely to change
seal hunt policy than if the DFO raised conservation concerns about the
seal hunt, or the sealers changed the nature of their activities. The
DFO is the propaganda arm of the government’s sealing policy. The
government’s seal hunt policy rests, ostensibly, on conservation
science. If the DFO raised the alarm about the high TAC, discredited
the “seals eat all the fish” argument, and recommended a
much reduced seal hunt for conservation reasons, the government would
have a plausible justification to reduce the hunt, even over the objections
of fishers and sealers. The sealers and the sealing industry, which overlaps
the fishers and fishing industry, are the least important group. Isolated — without
the active support of the DFO or the fishing industry — they would
lack the political relevance necessary to influence government policy.
A simple diagram of the relationship between the groups would look like
this:
To achieve
maximum effectiveness, “end the seal hunt” strategies
should target all four groups. The best strategies will also not only
end any benefits these groups derive from sealing, but will also exact
an unacceptable cost if sealing continues. Of the many other peripheral
groups who benefit from the industry, none significantly influence sealing
policy, and none would be capable of implementing an effective counter
campaign to the Strategy Framework. Consequently, their support of the
sealing industry does not require a great deal of attention beyond developing
rhetorical responses. “Public opinion” warrants the same
low level of consideration because Canadian or international public opinion
has minimal influence over sealing policy. As well, strategies targeting
those who neither benefit from nor actively support sealing, or who may
even oppose the seal hunt — the Canadian Atlantic tourism industry,
for example — are not only likely to fail, but will probably be
counter productive because they are correctly perceived to be unfair
and illegitimate. Moreover, targeting the innocent is usually poor strategy
because it diminishes the credibility of the advocacy organization.
A Political “Field Guide” to the Canadian Seal Hunt
It will
be immediately apparent to the biologists concerned about the seal
hunt that the relationship
between the relevant groups is a “political” ecosystem — a
political food web with life sustaining mutually beneficial exchanges
of votes, benefits, and services between the political species and the
individuals and populations that inhabit the various niches. This political
ecosystem warrants its own “field guide.” Each entry in the
field guide below describes one of the four relevant pro sealing groups;
explains its political “ecological” niche in and importance
to the seal hunt environment; and suggests a strategy for managing, controlling
or eradicating the harmful effects of the group. In at least one case,
it may be possible to turn a powerful pro seal hunt group into an ardent
anti seal hunt group.
Members of Parliament and federal political parties
Canadian federal politicians are the keystone group. Under Canada’s constitution, the federal government has absolute jurisdiction over “Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries.” For any reason whatsoever, the federal government can end the seal hunt or, indeed, order the extermination of the seals. In order to end the seal hunt, all strategies — even those directed at other groups — must be designed with the objective of influencing MPs and federal political parties.
For the most part, determining public policy in Canada is an exercise in accommodating the politically relevant. Seal hunt policy is no exception. Political relevance is the capacity to influence the electoral fortunes of elected policymakers. The greater an individual’s or organization’s influence over the casting of votes — either directly (3rd party campaigns, for example) or indirectly (political contributions, etc.) — the greater the political relevance. Politicians function in a vote economy; the currency is votes.
Politically, the Canadian seal hunt has a value of seven to a dozen federal seats in Atlantic Canada and Quebec. In the current Canadian political environment a pro seal hunt policy is necessary for a politician or a political party to get elected in these electoral districts. An anti seal hunt policy would insure defeat. In the rest of Canada, the seal hunt is electorally irrelevant: seal hunt policy, whether pro or anti, does not influence enough votes to matter. It is obvious to every politician and to all the federal parties that a pro seal hunt policy is good politics. Brian Tobin understood this when, as Minister of Fisheries and Oceans between 1993 and 1996, he and the federal Liberal government, through large subsidies, increased the number of seals slaughtered from an annual average of 50,000 to over 250,000, and all the while reaped only political benefits and suffered no political costs anywhere in Canada. The fact that a pro seal hunt policy is good politics is also why Jack Layton, the recently elected leader of the New Democratic Party, succumbed to seal hunt related pressure and fired his Chief of Staff, former IFAW national director, Rick Smith. Layton judged that sacking Smith would play well in Newfoundland, while costing him nothing politically in Toronto where he hopes to get elected.
The political benefits of a pro seal hunt policy can be eliminated and turned into unacceptable political costs by the direct involvement of animal welfare and environmental groups in elections. “Electoral involvement” does not mean protest activities or campaigns to raise public awareness during elections, not even if they were to be staged in vulnerable electoral districts. Just because an action occurs in the midst of an election does not mean it carries political relevance. Electoral involvement means conducting election campaigns in electoral districts that the voting history and polling suggest will likely be decided by 5% of the voters or less. The campaigns should be research based, politically sophisticated, should be seen to be politically sophisticated by the candidates and political parties, and should have the objective of shifting votes from one candidate to another, i.e. influencing who wins or who loses. It is this kind of political activity that is of concern to politicians.
In a politically sophisticated campaign, research and polling will decide the messaging with the best chance of influencing votes. Consequently, it is likely that the seal hunt itself would rarely be a key topic in the campaign advertising, as the seal hunt has little significance to the lives of most people in most electoral districts. In most electoral districts, the seal hunt issue will not shift enough votes to be meaningful. This is not a concern. Political power that flows from direct involvement in election campaigns accrues to the advocate not the issue. The proof of this law of politics can be seen in the pro seal hunt community. The federal government and all political parties have strong pro seal hunt policies, not because they believe sealing is intrinsically important, but rather because they are cognizant and wary of the political power wielded by the fishing community and, to a lesser extent, the sealing community. The political power resides in the pro seal hunt advocates, not the seal hunt issue.
Electoral involvement should not be viewed only as a stick to punish politicians. In most of the federal parties there are MPs who are worth helping get elected. While they may not overtly and publicly oppose the government’s seal hunt policies, they are open minded and share the animal welfare community’s concerns, and if it was demonstrated that it would be in their and their party’s political best interests to do so they would advocate gentler seal hunt policies in caucus or cabinet. It is important that politicians understand that good policies, no matter how modest, will be rewarded as readily as poor policies will be punished. Failure to ever support candidates leaves the correct impression that no matter what the government does, it will never gain the electoral support of the environmental or animal welfare communities. Moreover, helping a politician get elected results in a “friend” in the House of Commons. Politicians understand the value of loyalty, and will, if they can, help the people who helped them get elected.
To maximize the strategic benefits of electoral involvement, an active government relations program is needed. A regular flow of honest information between the government and advocacy groups before, during, and after elections leads to a trust, notwithstanding fundamental policy disagreements and the motives of the government and the advocacy group. While surprises and ambushes are fair tactics in an election, they are not productive outside of elections.
Politically sophisticated, effective electoral involvement that helps good politicians get elected, that cancels out the political benefits of the seal hunt, and that is augmented by a quality government-relationship program will result in seal hunt policy negotiations in which the advocate is at the table bargaining from a position of power rather than outside on the lawn throwing another protest.
Fishers, the fishing industry, and fishing organizations
The Atlantic Canadian fishing community is the most politically relevant group with a stake in promoting sealing. The group is made of up of hundreds of thousands of people and includes fishers, fishing companies, unions, non governmental organizations, and businesses and individuals that provide goods and services to the fishing industry. The community’s political relevance comes from the fact that they are well represented in most areas of the Atlantic provinces and make up an electorally significant number of votes. The fishing community is politically more important than the sealing community because fishers outnumbers sealers, and the fishing industry is economically more significant than sealing. While most sealers are involved in fishing, most fishers are not sealers. The fishing community’s support of sealing and high TACs is a major determinant of the government’s seal hunt policies. If the fishing community did not support the sealing industry or even opposed sealing, the government would have a powerful political incentive to change its seal hunt policies.
The fishing community’s support of sealing is based, to a mild extent, on a soft solidarity with the sealing community but, more importantly, on their belief that seals, if not the cause of fishery collapses, are preventing the recovery of commercial fish stocks because they eat fish. In the fishing community’s view, fewer seals will mean more commercial fish for fishers, and more money.
The strategic key to ending the fishing community’s support of sealing is economic. If supporting sealing cost the fishing community money and markets, its support of sealing would turn to opposition. Alternatively, the fishing industry’s support of the seal hunt will continue — and even increase — as long as its support does not trigger adverse economic consequences. Currently, the fishing community is justified in having little concern about its support of sealing. The fishing community’s support of sealing increased when it saw that Tobin’s five fold expansion of sealing caused no economic sanctions from the animal welfare and environmental communities. When Robert Thibault, the current Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, increased the TAC to its highest level in history, one million animals over three years — as the fishing community demanded — there was still no economic response from those working to protect the seals. More recently, the various seal hunt boycotts now underway are inexplicably targeting Canadian tourism, and therefore have no discernible effect on the fishing community. Because the actions of the animal welfare and environmental communities do not affect it, the fishing community has judged, quite rightly, that its best economic course is to lobby for sealing policies that would reduce seal populations, and, in their view, increase the amount of commercial fish they can sell.
A well managed, adequately funded boycott of all Canadian fish products in the markets of the north eastern United States and the United Kingdom would remove all of the fishing community’s economic incentive to support the government’s seal hunt policies. The north eastern United States is a major market for Canada’s east cost fisheries. The United Kingdom is a major market for west coast salmon. By including Canadian west coast fisheries in the boycott, pressure for a west coast seal hunt would be reduced, and the Canadian Alliance, which has many British Columbia MPs, would find it necessary to reconsider its seal hunt policy in order to maintain its base of support in west coast fishing communities.
Experience has shown that fish boycotts do not reduce the quantity of fish sold. What they do reduce is the price that a buyer will pay. Consequently, the fisher and the fishing industry are left with constant costs, much lower gross incomes, and net losses. As the wholesale price of fish is public information, the economic effect of a boycott can be constantly monitored.
Just as a quality government relations program is necessary to maximize the advantages of electoral involvement, so too is an industry relations program to maximize the effect of a fish products boycott. A boycott should not be launched until the government and the fishing community have been informed and briefed on the boycott’s elements, scope, and predictable consequences.
A second strategy that will raise extreme fears in the Canadian fishing community is a campaign in the United States to have Canada certified under the Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1967 (U.S. Pelly Amendment) on the basis that Canada’s poor fisheries management policies are putting at risk threatened and endangered species. Certification by the Commerce Department would give the U.S. Administration the authority to impose tariffs on Canadian fish products. Admittedly, the likelihood of getting tariffs imposed on Canadian fish products is unlikely, and such tariffs may contravene the North American Free Trade Agreement and other trade conventions. Nonetheless, because of past trade disputes like softwood lumber, and the willingness of US government to acquiesce to industry pressure and invoke trade sanctions, Canadians are deeply worried — and rightly so — about trade issues. A campaign to invoke Pelly, and the fear of catastrophic losses should the campaign be successful, will further chill the Canadian fishing community’s support of sealing.
As the IFAW demonstrated in the United Kingdom in the mid 80s, a properly executed fish product boycott is a very serious matter, because — when planned and implemented well — it is extremely effective, and wreaks measurable economic havoc on the target industry. It also has the desired political effect. It was the IFAW’s fish products boycott that stopped the Mulroney government from subsidizing the seal hunt after its economic collapse in the aftermath of the European seal product import ban. It is worth repeating, then, that before a Canadian fish products boycott is launched or a Pelly Amendment campaign is initiated, a diligent, concerted effort must be made to inform both the federal politicians and the fishing industry what is at stake. Boycotts are easier to launch than end. If US and UK consumers learn to avoid “Product of Canada” seafood it will take a great deal of time for them to resume buying Canadian seafood once the Canadian government changes its seal hunt policy. While tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars per year may be spent promoting the boycott, little more than a press release will likely be used to inform the public the boycott is over. Similarly for a Pelly Amendment campaign, if a coalition of American fishers, fishing organizations, environmentalists, and interested state and federal politicians organize to press for Canada’s certification, the coalition will take on a life of its own, will act in its own self interests, and will likely seek certification no matter what Canada’s policy on seals might be.
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
The Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans is the government agency that manages the seal hunt. However, more importantly for strategic purposes, it is also the crucial scientific propaganda arm of the government’s seal hunt policies. As is true for many environmental and wildlife issues, government seal hunt science is used not to inform and shape public policy, but rather to justify it. The government successfully maintains the fiction that its seal hunt policies are based on science, not political or economic considerations. DFO scientists provide the “political” science to support this assertion. DFO scientists who provide the right science in the government’s view are promoted, and those who voice scientific opinions inconsistent with government policy suffer a dead-end career track.
A strategy that thoroughly discredited the DFO and its scientists would serve two necessary strategic purposes. One, it would undermine the foundation and rationale upon which the Canadian government’s seal hunt policies are built and marketed to the public, press, and legislators. And, two — much more importantly — it would give the politicians a credible, convenient “whipping boy” and the politically necessary, plausibly justifiable reason for lowering the TAC to, perhaps, even zero: “We, your elected representatives, have been receiving poor advice from our scientists, and now we must adopt the precautionary principle to avoid an ecological disaster.”
The DFO has a disastrous record of fisheries management, and can be thoroughly discredited. Indeed, almost every species that has come under DFO management has suffered a population collapse — the cod collapse was not an exception, it was an example of the rule. One means to discredit the DFO takes its inspiration from Farley Mowat and his 1984 book Sea of Slaughter, which chronicled the Canadian government’s callous destruction of Atlantic Canada’s marine life. The book was eventually turned into a CBC documentary, and was re-released in 2003. The re release of Sea of Slaughter was prompted by the fact that the degraded state of the world’s fisheries and oceans has begun to capture the attention of the public. In just the first half of 2003 a number of books have appeared, including: Richard Ellis’s The Empty Ocean, Pauly and Maclean’s In a Perfect Ocean: The State of Fisheries and Ecosystems in the North Atlantic Ocean, and Sloan’s Ocean Bankruptcy: World Fisheries on the Brink of Disaster.
The IFAW, HSUS, and Greenpeace, and perhaps other organizations with an interest in ending the seal hunt, have access to the scientific expertise and likely the financial resources necessary to enter into agreements with publishers to publish books exposing and damning Canada’s and the DFO’s management of the Atlantic and Pacific living marine resources and environment. The major anti seal hunt groups are in a position to subsidize the authors, which means that the publishers would not need to provide advances against royalties, and they would be able to finance book promotion tours and publicity campaigns. While the books themselves would be of some importance, the real benefit of the books would be the earned media — print and electronic — which would publicize the DFO’s failures and their disastrous ecological consequences. A series of books — one every six months — would erode any credibility the DFO and scientists ever enjoyed. The publishers would gain the benefit of producing high quality books, written by well respected, highly qualified authors, that would be heavily promoted, and that would entail almost no financial risk on their parts.
Sealers, the sealing industry, and sealing organizations
Ironically, of all the stakeholders in the sealing issue, those who have the most to gain and lose are the least important in deciding public policy. The sealing industry and the sealers themselves are not economically important enough, and too few in number to matter politically without the active support of the wider fishing community. As was apparent prior to Tobin’s revival of the hunt to further his political career in Newfoundland, the support of the sealing industry is ephemeral, even in Newfoundland. In the absence of active propaganda sustaining the seal hunting fervor, Newfoundlanders’ interest in the hunt drifts, and — and as was apparent prior to Tobin — they are comfortable letting the seal hunt slip through benign neglect and decline back into their history.
Strategically, the sealing industry needs little attention. If electoral involvement turns the seal hunt into a political liability, if a Canadian fish products boycott makes fishing profitless, if the scientific foundation of the seal hunt crumples and its builders, DFO scientists, are discredited, there is little the sealing industry can do to prevent their industry from collapsing.
Nevertheless, because an effective ban on the importation of harp seal products into the EU would further insure the collapse of the Canadian seal hunt and, perhaps, the Greenland and Russian hunts, and increase the pressure on the Canadian government, research would be desirable into the political and legal feasibility of improving the current, but ineffective, ban on the importation of whitecoat products into the EU. A modernized ban would be subject to current international trade rules and would likely have to be broader than just whitecoats. However, it is possible — even likely — that the creative application of trade legislation, the implementation of targeted political and electoral strategies, and the raising of European public opinion would produce an EU equivalent to the US Marine Mammal Protection Act. This writer is aware that some have expressed grave reservations about revisiting the twenty year old European whitecoat product ban. However, the critics have yet to provide much more than anecdotes and unsupported fears to defend their reservations. Because much good for marine mammals would come from an EU Marine Mammal Act, and it would close the major market for products from the Canadian, Greenland, and Russian seal hunts, a thoughtful investigation is warranted into the practicality of the initiative. Notwithstanding the obvious broader animal welfare benefits of an EU MMA, ending the seal hunt in Canada is not contingent upon closing the European markets for Canadian harp seal products.
Closing Comments
The Policy Change “End the Seal Hunt” Strategy Framework is designed to turn the seal hunt into a personal liability to all the key people who now benefit from it. With all benefits “exsanguinated” from the seal hunt, the decision makers — as issue after issue has demonstrated — will conspire, however grudgingly, to effect the seal hunt’s humane death. The death should occur within two to five years. The Strategy Framework is also designed to greatly and permanently enhance the political relevance and credibility of the organization or organizations that use it. In the culture of politics, policymaking, and policy change — which is where the fate of the seals, like most other wildlife, environmental, and animal issues is determined — negotiable power decides who is important and, therefore, who is desirable as a “friend,” not the righteousness of a cause, not the presumed warmth of a personal relationship, nor the ubiquity of a protest.
The “End the Seal Hunt” Strategy Framework is based on strategies that have been proven to work in the past, and continue to work today. Moreover, these strategies have been proven when applied to the Canadian seal hunt. The framework avoids any strategies or protest activities that have failed to change government policy, and that continue to be ineffective even as these words are written. The political, economic, and cultural fundamentals that drive the Canadian seal hunt have not changed since the issue first captured the imagination of the public and press in the 60s. In the four decades since, many strategies have been tested on the seal hunt issue. Indeed, even the latest strategies being employed or suggested today in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom are neither new nor innovative. Consequently, their outcomes are predictable. Dependable evidence now exists about which strategies developed to end the seal hunt will work and which will fail.
In closing, it is crucial to emphasize that strategies are only as good as the tactics that implement them. Tactics that are poorly planned, denied adequate resources, and badly executed will not implement even the most brilliant strategy. As much — or more — care and attention must go into researching, planning, scheduling, budgeting, and monitoring the execution of tactics as into the development of strategy. Too often the animal welfare and environmental communities confuse strategy and tactics. What is thought to be a strategy is often, in fact, an orphan tactic or a local skirmish: a cris de cœur that has little hope of securing the desired policy change.
Proven strategies, appropriate tactics, quality human resources, and adequate financial support will deliver the desired policy change: the end of the seal hunt.